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Abstract
We consider an incumbent ﬁrm and a more e!cient entrant, both
oering a network good to several asymmetric buyers. The incumbent
disposes of an installed base, while the entrant has a network of size zero
at the outset, and needs to attract a critical mass of buyers to operate.
We analyze dierent price schemes (uniform pricing, implicit price dis-
crimination - or rebates, explicit price discrimination) and show that the
schemes which - for given market structure - induce lower equilibrium
prices are also those under which the incumbent is more likely to exclude
the rival.
JEL classiﬁcation: L11, L14, L42.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper deals with exclusionary pricing practices, that is anti-competitive
pricing behavior by a ﬁrm endowed with a “dominant position” (as called in
the EU), or with “monopoly power” (as called in the US). One such practice
which has recently received renewed attention is rebates, i.e. discounts applicable
where a customer exceeds a speciﬁed target for sales in a deﬁned period.
There are dierent types of rebates, or discounts. They can be made con-
tingent on the buyer making most or all of its purchases from the same supplier
(”ﬁdelity” or ”loyalty” rebates), on increasing its purchases relative to previous
years, or on purchasing certain quantity thresholds speciﬁed in absolute terms.
It is on this last category of rebates that we focus here.
In the US, rebates have received a very favorable treatment by the courts for
many years. Under US case law (see e.g. the Virgin v. British Airways (2001)
case), loyalty rebates are generally said to promote competition on the merits
as a rule, and it is for the plainti to demonstrate their anticompetitive eect.1
I nt h eE U ,r e b a t e sh a v el o n gb e e nl o o k e da tw i t hs u s p i c i o nb yt h eE u r o -
pean Commission (which is the EU Competition Authority) and the Commu-
nity Courts, which have systematically imposed large ﬁnes on dominant ﬁrms
applying dierent forms of rebates.2 But until the recent Michelin II judgment,
dominant ﬁrms were at least allowed to grant standardized quantity discounts,
that is standardized rebates given to any buyer whose purchases exceed a prede-
termined number of units; Michelin II, instead, has established that even stan-
dardized quantity discounts are anticompetitive if used by a dominant ﬁrm.3>4
One of the objectives of this paper is to take seriously the Community Court’s
assessment, and study whether rebates, in the form of pure quantity discounts,
can have anticompetitive eects. A key feature of the environment we consider
are scale eects, that we choose to model as scale economies on the demand side
(but the main insights of the paper would also hold good with production scale
economies, as we explain in Section 6).
More precisely, we study an industry exhibiting network eects, and we ﬁnd
that if rebates are allowed, an incumbent ﬁrm having a critical customer base
is more likely to exclude a more e!cient entrant that can use the same rebate
schemes but does not have a customer base yet. Rebates are a form of implicit
1See Kobayashi (2005) for a review of the US case law on rebates. The few instances in
which the courts found anticompetitive rebates concern multimarket or multiproduct cases.
The treatment of bundled rebates (beyond the scope of this paper) is currently debated in the
US.
2For a review of the EU case law on rebates, see e.g. Gyselen (2003).
3Unless they are ’objectively’ justiﬁed, that is unless the dominant ﬁrm can prove that the
discount matches savings from transaction costs.
4The (almost) per se illegal status of exclusive contracts, rebates and discriminatory prices
by dominant ﬁrms in the EU, as well as the dierence relative to their treatment in the US (at
least until recently), has led to a hot debate on the EU policy towards abuse of dominance.
See Gual et al. (2006) for a contribution to the debate.
1discrimination, and the incumbent can use them to make more attractive oers
to some crucial group of consumers, thereby depriving the entrant of the critical
mass of consumers it needs (in our model, network externalities imply that
consumers will want to consume a network product only if demand has reached
a critical threshold).
Now, discrimination (implicit and even more so explicit discrimination) will
allow the incumbent to play o the dierent groups of consumers against each
other. This strategic use of price discrimination will exacerbate the coordination
problems that buyers face, which in turn makes entry even more di!cult for the
n e wr i v a l .O n l yv e r ye !cient entrants will be able to overcome the entry barriers
that incumbents can raise in this manner.
To give an example of the type of industry that we have in mind, let us
brieﬂy review the Microsoft Licensing Case of 1994-95 (Civil Action No. 94-
1564). Microsoft markets its PC operating systems (Windows and MS-DOS)
primarily through original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”), which manufac-
ture PCs. When discussing the substantial barriers to entry for potential rivals
of Microsoft, the Complaint explicitly mentions “the di!culty in convincing
OEMs to oer and promote a non-Microsoft PC operating system, particularly
one with a small installed base”.
The US Department of Justice alleged that Microsoft designed its pricing
policy “to deter OEMs from entering into licensing agreements with competing
operating system providers”, thereby reinforcing the entry barriers raised by
the network eects that are inherent in this industry. In particular, the use
of two-part taris, with high ﬁxed fees and zero per-copy price, is considered
strongly anti-competitive. Interestingly, though, the Final Judgment explicitly
allows Microsoft to continue granting “volume discounts” (i.e. rebates), as long
as Microsoft would use linear prices rather than two-part taris. It is not clear
why two-part pricing and quantity discounts are treated dierently, because our
paper suggests that both types of pricing schemes can be exclusionary.
Although rebates may have exclusionary eects, it is far from clear that they
should be presumed to be welfare-detrimental, even if used by a dominant ﬁrm.
As John Vickers, then Chairman of the UK O!ce of Fair Trading, put it:
“These cases about discounts and rebates, on both sides of the Atlantic,
illustrate sharply a fundamental dilemma for the competition law treatment of
abuse of market power. A ﬁrm with market power that oers discount or rebate
schemes to dealers is likely to sell more, and its rivals less, than in the absence
of the incentives. But that is equally true of low pricing generally.” (Vickers,
2005: F252)
Discriminatory pricing has similar contrasting eects. Consider for instance
an oligopolistic industry. On the procompetitive side, it allows ﬁrms to decrease
prices to particular customers, thereby intensifying competition: each ﬁrm can
be more aggressive in the rival’s customer segments while maintaining higher
prices with the own customer base, but since each ﬁrm will do the same, dis-
criminatory pricing will result in ﬁercer competition than uniform pricing, and
2consumers will beneﬁt from it.5 On the anticompetitive side, though, in asym-
metric situations discriminatory pricing may allow a dominant ﬁrm to achieve
cheaper exclusion of a weaker rival: prices do not need to be decreased for all
customers but only for the marginal customers.6
This fundamental dilemma between, on the one hand, the e!ciency eects
(consumers would buy more and pay less) created by rebates and discriminatory
pricing and, on the other hand, their potential exclusionary eects (rival ﬁrms
would be hurt by such practices, and may be driven out of the market), is one
of the main themes of the paper. Indeed, we shall study here dierent pricing
schemes that both an incumbent and a rival ﬁrm can adopt, and show that the
schemes which - for given market structure - induce a higher level of welfare are
also those under which the incumbent is more likely to exclude the rival. More
speciﬁcally, we show that explicit price discrimination is the pricing scheme
with the highest exclusionary potential (and hence the worst welfare outcomes
if exclusion does occur), followed by implicit price discrimination (i.e., rebates,
or pure quantity discounts) and then uniform pricing. However, for given market
structure (i.e., when we look at equilibria where entry does occur), the welfare
ranking is exactly reversed: the more aggressive the pricing scheme the lower the
prices (and thus the higher the surplus) at equilibrium. This trade-o between
maximizing the entrant’s chances to enter and minimizing welfare losses for
given market structure, illustrates the di!culties that antitrust agencies and
courts ﬁnd in practice: a tough stance against discounts and other aggressive
pricing strategies may well increase the likelihood that monopolies or dominant
positions are successfully contested, but may also deprive consumers of the
possibility to enjoy lower prices, if entry did occur.
Although it deals with pricing schemes rather than contracts, our paper
is closely related to the literature on anticompetitive exclusive dealing. Since
Segal and Whinston (2000) is probably the closest work to ours,7 let us be more
speciﬁc on the dierences with their work. Building on Rasmusen et al. (1991),
they show the exclusionary potential of exclusive contracts when the incumbent
can discriminate on the compensatory oers it makes to buyers. Our study
diers from theirs in several respects: (i) in their game the incumbent has a
(ﬁrst-mover) strategic advantage in that it is allowed to contract with buyers
before entry occurs; (ii) if buyers accept the exclusivity oer of the incumbent,
they commit to it and cannot renegotiate it even if entry occurs; (iii) buyers are
symmetric and only linear pricing is considered. In our paper, instead, (i) the
5See Thisse and Vives (1998). For a recent survey on discriminatory pricing, see e.g. Stole
(2005).
6See e.g. Armstrong and Vickers (1993).
7Bernheim and Whinston (1998) analyze the possible exclusionary eects of exclusive deal-
ing when ﬁrms make simultaneous oers (as in our paper), but in non-coincident markets:
ﬁrst, exclusivity is oered to a buyer in a ﬁrst market; afterwards, oers are made to a buyer
in a second market. In their terminology, our paper is looking at coincident market eects,
which makes our analysis closer to Aghion and Bolton (1985), Rasmusen et al. (1991), Segal
and Whinston (2000) and Fumagalli and Motta (2006). All these papers, however, study only
exclusive dealing arrangements and assume that the entrant can enter the market (if at all)
only after the incumbent and the buyers have negotiated an exclusive contract.
3incumbent and the entrant choose price schedules simultaneously, (ii) buyers
simply observe prices and decide which ﬁrm to buy from (therefore avoiding
any problems related to assumptions on commitment and renegotiation); (iii)
we explore the role of rebates and quantity discounts in a world where buyers
dier in size. Yet, the mechanisms which lead to exclusion in the two papers are
very similar: both papers present issues of buyers’ miscoordination, and scale
economies which are created by ﬁxed costs in their model are created instead
by network eects in ours.
Our paper is also related to Innes and Sexton (1993, 1994), who also analyze
the anticompetitive potential of discriminatory pricing. In their papers, how-
ever, they consider a very dierent contracting environment, strategic variables,
and timing of the game. In particular, after the incumbent made its oers, they
allow the buyers to contract with the entrant (or to enter themselves), so as to
create countervailing power to the incumbent’s. Despite all these dierences,
Innes and Sexton’s insight that discrimination helps the incumbent to ‘divide
and conquer’ consumers reappears in our paper, even if we also allow for the
entrant to use the same discriminatory tools available to the incumbent, and
even if contrary to Innes and Sexton’s (1994) ﬁnding, in our case a ban on dis-
crimination cannot prevent ine!cient outcomes: in our setting, exclusion can
arise also under uniform linear pricing.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on incompatible entry in net-
work industries. The very nature of network eects provides a strong incum-
bency advantage, shielding dominant ﬁrms against competitors even in the ab-
sence of any anticompetitive conduct (Farrell and Klemperer (2006)). Crémer
et al. (2000) show that compatibility is a key variable in determining whether
or not an entrant can successfully challenge an incumbent. Under incompati-
bility, entry equilibria may not even exist, and when they exist, the incumbent
is likely to maintain a higher market share than under compatibility. Thus,
if compatibility is a choice variable, the incumbent can use it strategically to
deter entry. Where incompatibility could be overcome through multi-homing,
Shapiro (1999) argues that incumbents can use exclusive dealing contracts to
block multi-homing, thus excluding a technologically superior ﬁrm. Our pa-
per adds to this literature in showing that even simple price discrimination can
be su!cient for an incumbent to deter a more e!cient ﬁrm in such network
industries.
The paper continues in the following way. Section 2 describes the model,
Section 3 solves the model under the assumption that prices have to be non-
negative. Three cases are analyzed: uniform pricing, explicit (or 3rd degree)
price discrimination and implicit (or 2nd degree, or rebates) price discrimina-
tion. Section 4 studies the eects of the dierent pricing schemes on consumer
surplus. Section 5 discusses some extensions of the model. First, we consider
the possibility that ﬁrms subsidize customers’ usage, i.e., can charge negative
linear prices; second, we turn to the case of elastic (linear) demands, allowing
f o rb o t hl i n e a ra n dt w o - p a r tt a r i s; third, we discuss the case of full (or buyer-
speciﬁc) discrimination (in the base model we do not allow ﬁrms to discriminate
4across identical buyers); ﬁnally, we look at the case where buyers are approached
sequentially, rather than simultaneously, by the suppliers. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2T h e s e t u p
Consider an industry composed of two ﬁrms, the incumbent L, and an entrant
H. The incumbent supplies a network good, and has an installed consumer
base of size L A 0. (The network good is durable: “old” buyers will continue
to consume it but no longer need to buy it.) L incurs constant marginal cost
fL 5 (0>1) for each unit it produces of the network good.
The entrant can supply a competing network good at marginal cost fH ?f L,
i.e. it is more cost-e!cient than the incumbent. H has not been active in the
market so far, that is it has installed base H =0 , but it can start supplying
the good any time; in particular, when the game starts it does not have to sink
any ﬁxed costs of entry.
The good can be sold to p +1dierent “new” buyers, indexed by m =
1>===>p+1 .T h e r e a r e p  1 identical small buyers, and 1 large buyer.8
Goods acquired by one buyer cannot be resold to another buyer, but they can
be disposed of at no cost by the buyer who bought them (in case the latter
cannot consume them). Side payments of any kind between buyers are ruled
out. Deﬁne ﬁrm l’s network size vl (where l = L>H)a s
vl = l + t1
l + ===+ t
p+1
l (1)
i.e. the ﬁrm’s installed base plus its total sales to all “new” buyers.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that demands are inelastic. (Section 5.2
presents the results for linear demand functions.) A buyer will either buy from
the incumbent, or from the entrant (but not from both). The large buyer can
consume at most To =1n units, while any small buyer can consume at most
Tv = n
p units. Total market size is normalized to 1: p(n@p)+( 1 n)=1 .
Buyers exert positive consumption externalities on each other: If ﬁrm l’s
network size vl is below the threshold level ¯ v, consumption of l’s good gives zero
surplus to its buyer.9 The goods produced by the two ﬁrms are incompatible,
so that buyers of ﬁrm l do not exert network externalities on buyers of ﬁrm
m. For a network good of su!cient size, large and small buyers have the same
maximum willingness to pay of ¯ s =1 .
8We assume p D 1 so as to allow for the large buyer to be smaller than the set of all
small buyers (which in turn allows for the large buyer to receive better price oers) and to
show that prices under rebates depend on the degree of fragmentation of small buyers (and
converge to prices under explicit discrimination as p <" ).
9The assumption that a buyer’s utility from consuming is positive only if the network in
question reaches the threshold size ¯ v is designed to capture in an admittedly simple way the
presence of network eects. Rather than assuming that the utility of a consumer increases
continuously with network size, we assume a discontinuous formulation; this also has the
advantage that the old generation of buyers can be safely ignored when studying welfare
eects: since we shall assume that they have already attained the highest level of utility, new
buyers’ decisions will never aect old buyers’ utility.
5We assume that
L  ¯ v (2)
i.e. the incumbent has already reached the minimum size, while the entrant’s
installed base is H =0 . In order to operate successfully, the entrant will have
to attract enough buyers to reach ¯ v.10
Let the unit prices oe r e db yt h et w oﬁ r m st oab u y e ro ft y p em = o>v be
s
m
L  1 and s
m





1  n if m = o
n
p if m = v
(3)
The parameter n 5 (0>1) is an indicator of the relative weight of the small
buyers in total market size: 1  n measures the large buyer’s market share,
while n measures the market share of the group of small buyers. Assume that
1  nAn @ p , so that the large buyer’s demand is always larger than a small
buyer’s demand (provided they both demand strictly positive quantities). Note
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The demand functions deﬁned above can be derived from these expressions of
net consumer surplus.
Since both types of buyers have the same prohibitive price ¯ s =1 ,am o n o p o -
list who could charge discriminatory linear prices would set a uniform unit price
sp
l =1 . Thus, discriminatory pricing can arise only as a result of the strategic
interaction between the incumbent and the entrant.
We assume that neither demand of the large buyer alone, nor demand of all
small buyers taken together, is su!cient for the entrant to reach the minimum
size:
¯ vAmax {1  n>n}= (6)
10Note that if the entrant manages to reach the minimum size ¯ v, then consumers will consider
L’s and H’s networks as being of homogenous quality, even if vL 6= vH.
11These quantities apply for general (positive or negative) prices. In the base model we
restrict prices to be non-negative. Section 5 considers the case where prices can be negative.
6In other words, in order to reach the minimum size, the entrant has to serve the
large buyer plus at least one (and possibly more than one) small buyer.12>13
Note that only units which are actually consumed by a buyer count towards
ﬁrm l’s network size.
We also assume that the threshold level ¯ v is such that if the entrant sells to
all p +1new buyers, then it will reach the minimum size: ¯ v  1=
This, together with the assumption fH ?f L, implies that the social planner
would want the entrant (and not the incumbent) to serve all buyers.
The game. Play occurs in the following sequence: At time w =0 ,t h e
incumbent and the entrant simultaneously announce their prices, which will be
binding in w =1 .A t t i m e w =1 ,e a c ho ft h ep +1buyers decides whether
to patronize the incumbent or the entrant. We also assume that oers are
observable to everyone, e.g. because they have to be posted publicly. Then,
when the buyers have to decide which ﬁrm to buy from, the ﬁrms’ oers will be
common knowledge.
As for the prices that ﬁrms can oer in w =0 , in the base model (Section 3) we
will restrict attention to linear pricing schemes, but we consider three dierent
possibilities: (1) uniform prices (Section 3.1); (2) explicit (or third-degree) price
discrimination (Section 3.2); and (3) the case of central interest, that is implicit
(or second-degree) price discrimination, i.e. the case of standardized quantity
discounts or “rebates” (Section 3.3).
Uniform pricing means that a ﬁrm must charge the same price to all buyers.
Under explicit price discrimination, each ﬁrm can set one price for the large
buyer, and a dierent price for the small buyers (all buyers of the same type
will be charged the same price). Under implicit price discrimination, all buyers
are oered the same price menu, where dierent prices apply depending on
whether the buyer reaches a certain quantity threshold or not: if this menu is
designed appropriately, buyers will self-select into dierent taris: small buyers
will buy below the threshold, while the large buyer will buy above the threshold,
and so the large buyer will end up paying a dierent price than the small buyers.
Explicit discrimination may not always be feasible, for instance because of in-
formational constraints (ﬁrms cannot observe buyer types), or because of policy
constraints. However, when buyers are asymmetric, pure standardized quantity
discounts can induce de facto discrimination, and so allow ﬁrms to (imperfectly)
replicate outcomes under explicit discrimination.
Section 5 will show that the main results are robust to changes in the as-
sumptions we make in the base model on prices. There, we shall analyze the
cases where prices can be negative, where demand is elastic, and where full
price discrimination is allowed, that is ﬁrms can make buyer-speciﬁc oers (in
12If either ¯ v?1 3 n,o r¯ v?n , then the miscoordination issues, which are at the heart of
this paper, would not arise.
13W ec o u l da s s u m ei na d d i t i o nt h a t¯ v $ 1 3 n + n@p, so that the large buyer plus exactly
one small buyer is su!cient for H to reach the minimum size. This assumption only changes
the analysis of miscoordination equilibria when ﬁrms can charge negative prices.
7the base model, we do not allow ﬁrms to discriminate among buyers of the same
type).
3 Equilibrium solutions, under dierent price
regimes
In this Section, we assume that ﬁrms set linear (and non-negative) prices, and
we ﬁnd the equilibria under the three dierent price regimes.
3.1 Uniform pricing
Assume that ﬁrms can only use uniform linear prices, sl with l = L>H. Recall
that any buyer’s demand for H’s good, t
m
H (===>v H), depends on the size of H’s








Thus, in line with Segal and Whinston (2000), we ﬁnd that our game has two
types of pure-strategy Nash equilibria: where all buyers buy from the incumbent,
and the other where all buyers (or su!ciently many) buy from the entrant. The
following proposition shows the highest prices that can be sustained in each of
these two types of equilibria.
Proposition 1 (equilibria under uniform linear prices) If ﬁrms can only use
uniform ﬂat prices, the following two pure-strategy Nash equilibria exist under
the continuation equilibria as speciﬁed:
(i) Miscoordination equilibrium: L sets sL = sp
L =1, H sets sH =
sp
H =1 , and in all continuation equilibria where sH  sL,a l lb u y e r sb u yf r o m
L.
(ii) Entry equilibrium: H sets sH = fL, L sets sL = fL, and in all contin-
uation equilibria where sH  sL,a l lb u y e r sb u yf r o mH.
The prices in (i) and (ii) are the highest that can be sustained in each type
of equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix A
To understand Proposition 1, note that there are two types of buyers’ equi-
libria when sH  sL. First, there is a miscoordination equilibrium where all
buyers buy from the incumbent: despite the higher price sL, no buyer has an
incentive to deviate, since the entrant’s network would be below the critical
size, and buying from the entrant would then give zero (gross) utility. Second,
there is an equilibrium where all buyers buy from the entrant: no buyer has an
incentive to deviate given that all others buy from the entrant, since he would
pay a (weakly) higher price sL for a product which is as good as the entrant’s
(if all buy, the entrant reaches critical size).14
14To be precise, if sL = sH, there is also a buyers’ equilibrium where some buyers (in a
su!cient number for the entrant to reach the critical size) buy from the entrant and the
remaining buyers buy from the incumbent.
8Continuation equilibria play a role for the equilibrium at the ﬁrms’ decision
stage. Consider the candidate miscoordination equilibrium where sH = sL =
1 and all buyers buy from the incumbent. This equilibrium is sustained by
having that when sH  sL the chosen continuation equilibria are those where
all buyers will buy from the incumbent.15 Otherwise, a deviation by the entrant
could attract all the buyers, undermining the candidate equilibrium. Likewise,
consider the candidate entry equilibrium where sH = fL = sL and all buyers buy
from the entrant. Because of the multiplicity of equilibria, when the incumbent
deviates by increasing its price, there might also be a continuation equilibrium
where sH ?s L and all buyers buy from the incumbent. To eliminate such
counter-intuitive deviations, it is required that in all continuation equilibria
where sH  sL all buyers buy from the entrant.
The equilibria characterized in Proposition 1 represent extreme cases, in the
sense that the underlying continuation equilibria are the most favorable ones
for the ﬁrm that serves the buyers in equilibrium. These equilibria are by no
means the only equilibria that can arise in our game.
For instance, there are other equilibria where all buyers do miscoordinate
on the incumbent, but the latter can at most charge some price ˜ sL ?s p
L =1 .
Such an equilibrium can be sustained by continuation equilibria where buyers
buy from L as long as sH  sL  ˜ sL,b u tw o u l ds w i t c ht oH if sL exceeded
˜ sL. Likewise, there are entry equilibria where the entrant must charge a strictly
lower price than fL to induce buyers to coordinate on H. For the rest of the paper,
we will focus on those continuation equilibria which are the most proﬁtable ones
for the ﬁrm that eventually serves the buyers. The motivation for this choice is
two-fold: First, these equilibria are the Pareto-dominant ones from the point of
view of the ﬁrms. Second, from a policy point of view, the equilibria with the
highest proﬁts are those which cause most concern.
3.2 Explicit (3rd degree) discrimination
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze miscoordination equilibria and then entry equi-
libria.
3.2.1 Miscoordination equilibria
Proposition 1 gives us the equilibrium for the case of uniform linear pricing.
Assume now that the two ﬁrms can do 3rd degree (or explicit) discrimination,






, one price for the large buyer, and
another for the small buyers (this is partial discrimination: ﬁrms cannot oer
dierent prices to buyers of the same size).
With respect to the uniform pricing case, nothing changes in the miscoor-
dination equilibria, the most proﬁtable of which is for the Incumbent still the
15In this situation, the entrant is indierent among all prices sH D 0 it could charge, and





L =1 ,16 while the entrant sets sp
H =1and all buyers
buy from L. Clearly, the incumbent would have no incentive to deviate from
this solution. No buyer would deviate either: if any of them decided to accept a
lower price oered by the entrant given that all others buy from the incumbent,
he would have zero surplus and would reduce his utility.
Proposition 2 (miscoordination equilibria under explicit discrimination) Let
each ﬁrm choose a pair of prices (sv
L>s o
L),o n ef o re a c ht y p eo fb u y e r . U n d e r
the appropriate continuation equilibria, the miscoordination equilibrium where












L, or both, all buyers buy from L. Then, even if the
entrant can charge dierent prices to both groups (where both prices may be
strictly lower than L’s prices), no single buyer will have an incentive to switch
to the entrant as long as he expects all other buyers to buy from L: H’s net-
work cannot reach the minimum size with only one buyer, so its good gives
zero utility, and as long as H charges a non-negative price for it, L’s oer will
(weakly) dominate H’s oer. The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of
Proposition 1.¤
Thus, the possibility to price discriminate does not allow the entrant to solve
the miscoordination problem. Hence, miscoordination equilibria will continue
to exist even if we allow for explicit price discrimination.
3.2.2 Entry equilibria
For entry equilibria, things change relative to the uniform pricing case. To ﬁx
ideas, start with the candidate entry equilibrium where both ﬁrms charge fL and
all buyers buy from the entrant (we have seen that this is an entry equilibrium
in the uniform linear pricing case). This equilibrium can be disrupted by the
incumbent setting a price fL   to one category of buyers and the monopoly
price to the other category: the loss made on the former would be outweighed by
the proﬁts made on the latter. Indeed, under this deviation the former category
strictly prefers to buy from L, thus preventing the entrant from reaching the
minimum size, and the latter category would then prefer to buy from L rather
than from the entrant, since they would derive zero utility from buying from H.
Therefore, an entry equilibrium can exist only if it is immune to the devia-
tions outlined above, i.e. if the entrant’s prices to both large and small buyers
are so low that the incumbent cannot proﬁtably undercut either of the two
prices while charging the monopoly price to the other group. This implies that
the highest prices that the entrant can charge in any entry equilibrium will be
strictly below fL. Thus, for an entry equilibrium to exist, the e!ciency gap
between entrant and incumbent must be large enough.
16Note that in our model the monopoly price charged by a ﬁrm under explicit discrimination
will be the same for all buyers. This is clearly a special feature of the model, which simpliﬁes
the analysis without losing much insight.
10Proposition 3 (entry equilibria under explicit discrimination) Under ex-
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Proof: see Appendix A
Figure 1 illustrates the results of Proposition 3 (recall that miscoordination
equilibria exist for all parameter values). The ﬁgure shows that, for given n,t h e
Figure 1: Regions where entry equilibria exist and do not exist under explicit
price discrimination (the grey areas are outside of the parameter space)
larger fL with respect to fH, the more likely for entry to be an equilibrium of the
game. The intuition is straightforward: if the incumbent is less e!cient, it will
ﬁnd it more di!cult to proﬁtably make low (discriminatory) price oers to the
buyers, which in turn makes it possible for the entrant to sustain higher (more
proﬁtable) prices which are immune to incumbent’s deviations. The eect of n
11on equilibrium outcomes is slightly more complex. Entry is more likely at very
low levels and very high levels of n. To understand why, consider for instance a
candidate entry equilibrium (sv
H>s o
H) when n is very small. In order to disrupt
this equilibrium, the incumbent could discriminate across buyers, by oering
small buyers a very low price and recovering losses on these buyers by setting a
high price to the large buyer, and vice versa. However, since n is very small, the
incumbent cannot oer the large buyer a price (much) below fL,s i n c et h ep r o ﬁ t s
it could make on the small buyers are very small (they account for a tiny part
of the total market). In contrast, it could use the proﬁts it makes on the (very)
large buyer to decrease considerably the price oered to the small buyers. But
since prices are restricted to be non-negative here, the incumbent’s best oer to
the small buyers will be sv
L =0 . In order to avoid deviations, the entrant will
therefore have to set sv
H =0and so
H slightly lower than fL.A s s m a l l b u y e r s
account for a small proportion of demand (n is very small), the entrant will make
positive proﬁts at these prices, and the entry equilibrium will exist. The same
argument can be used symmetrically to explain why entry equilibria are more
likely to exist if n is su!ciently large. Of course, one important component of
this result is that prices cannot go below zero. We shall see below that when
prices may be negative, n will aect results monotonically.
To sum up:
• Exclusionary equilibria always exist, and the highest sustainable prices
are exactly the same as under uniform linear pricing.
• Entry equilibria only exist if fL is high enough relative to fH.W h e n
they exist, note that the highest sustainable equilibrium prices are always
strictly below fL (which is the highest sustainable equilibrium price under
uniform linear pricing).
• With respect to uniform pricing, thus, price discrimination (i.e. a more
aggressive pricing strategy): (a) on the one hand, makes exclusion more
likely; (b) on the other hand, for given market structure, results in (weakly)
lower prices.17
A note on possible policy options As a corollary of Propositions 2 and
3, an asymmetric policy which prohibits below-cost or discriminatory prices by
the incumbent, while allowing any kind of pricing by the entrant, will not solve
the fundamental dilemma between exclusion and low prices. As argued in the
proof of Proposition 2, price discrimination does not enable the entrant to break
miscoordination equilibria (unless it can charge negative prices, which we will
deal with later). Moreover, the incumbent’s ability to charge below-cost prices is
irrelevant for the existence of such equilibria. Thus, miscoordination equilibria
will exist even under an asymmetric ban on discrimination (or a ban of below-
cost prices). The only eect of such a policy would be on entry equilibria: If the
17In the entry equilibria, prices are strictly lower; in the exclusionary equilibrium, prices to
both groups of buyers are the same as under uniform pricing.
12incumbent is prevented from charging below-cost prices (or equivalently, from
discriminating among buyers), the incumbent cannot disrupt entry equilibria
in the manner described in Proposition 3. Thus, entry equilibria will exist for
the entire parameter space, as in the case where both ﬁrms are forced to charge
uniform prices. Yet, the highest sustainable prices in the entry equilibrium
are again the incumbent’s marginal cost, which are higher than the highest
sustainable prices under explicit discrimination. Thus, an asymmetric anti-
discrimination policy would have the same eects as a symmetric imposition
of uniform pricing, making exclusion less likely, but on the other hand raising
prices to consumers in the case of entry.
3.3 Implicit (2nd degree) discrimination (or rebates)
Let us now consider the case where ﬁrms cannot condition their oers directly
on the type of buyer (large or small), but have to make uniform oers to both














l  ¯ tl
(7)
(If the buyer buys exactly the threshold quantity, t
m
l =¯ tl, the ﬁrm may either
charge sl>1 or sl>2.) Each buyer can now choose his tari from this price menu
by buying either below the sales target ¯ tl or above it.
It is well-known that such quantity discounts or rebates, when applied to
buyers who dier in size, will be a tool of (de facto) discrimination, even if the
schemes as such are uniform. But to achieve discrimination, the tarish a v et o
be set in a way that induces buyers to self-select into the right bracket, with
small buyers voluntarily buying below target, and the large buyer choosing to
buy above it.
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r e¯ tl ? 1n. Then, the large buyer can either buy 1n
units at price sl>2, which yields total surplus FVo (sl>2>1  n)=( 1n)(1sl>2),
or he can buy the threshold quantity ¯ tl at price sl>1 (i.e. a quantity which falls
short of his actual demand at this price), in which case his net consumer surplus
is FVo (sl>1> ¯ tl)=( 1 sl>1)¯ tl.I f sl>1 is su!ciently lower than sl>2,i tm a yb e
worthwhile for the large buyer to buy fewer units than he wants in return for a
lower per unit price.18
Next, consider the case where ¯ tl An @ p . A typical small buyer m = v will
then have to choose between buying n@p units at price sl>1,w h i c hy i e l d st o t a l
surplus FVv (sl>1>n@p)=( 1sl>1)(n@p), or buying the sales target ¯ tl at price
sl>2 (i.e. a quantity which exceeds his actual demand at this price), giving total
surplus of FVv (sl>2> ¯ tl)= n
p  sl>2¯ tl.I n t h i s c a s e , i f sl>2 is su!ciently lower
18Assume that each buyer is only allowed one transaction. This rules out the possibility
that a large buyer makes ”multiple small purchases” so as to buy a large amount of units
at the lower price. Presumably, important transaction costs may be invoked to justify this
assumption, which in a way is nothing else than the counterpart of the assumption that a
small buyer cannot buy a large quantity and then resell it to others. In both cases, it is
arbitrage which is prevented.
13than sl>1, the small buyer will want to purchase more units than he can actually
consume in order to qualify for a lower unit price.19
We say that ﬁrm l’s oer satisﬁes the ”self-selection conditions” if the large
buyer prefers to buy above the threshold, and the small buyers prefer to buy
below the threshold, i.e. if
FVo (sl>2>1  n)  FVo (sl>1> ¯ tl) (8)
and FVv (sl>1>n@p)  FVv (sl>2> ¯ tl)







,f o rl = L>H.
We now look for the equilibria that arise in this game when both ﬁrms can
use quantity discounts.
3.3.1 Miscoordination equilibria
Proposition 4 (miscoordination equilibria under rebates) Let ﬁrms use rebates
as deﬁned in (7). Under the appropriate continuation equilibria, the miscoordi-
nation equilibrium exists for all parameter values, and the highest (monopoly)
prices can be sustained at equilibrium.
Proof: analogous proof as for the above cases.
Miscoordination arises under rebates for the same reason as under uniform
pricing and explicit discrimination, which were discussed at length above. In the
most proﬁtable equilibrium, the incumbent does not actually oer a discount to
either of the two groups, but charges the same (monopoly) price sv
L = so
L =1
to both large and small buyers. This oer trivially satisﬁes the self-selection
conditions deﬁned in (8).
3.3.2 Entry equilibria
The implicitly discriminatory eect of rebates gives rise to an exclusionary mech-
anism similar the one under explicit discrimination. Since buyers are asym-
metric, they can be induced to self-select either into the high-quantity or the
low-quantity bracket of the price menu, thus allowing the incumbent to de facto
price-discriminate between them. This in turn enables the incumbent to oer a
below-cost price to one group, thus winning their orders, while making up for
the resulting losses by charging a high price (possibly the monopoly price) to
the other group.
The major dierence between explicit and implicit discrimination lies in the
self-sorting conditions, which reduce the range of prices that the incumbent can
oer. Consider for instance the case where, under explicit discrimination, the
19Recall that we exclude reselling of units between buyers (while allowing for free disposal),
so the only thing a small buyer can do with units he cannot consume is to throw them away.
14incumbent charges the monopoly price sv
L =1to the small buyers, and so
L =0to
the large buyer. Clearly, this oer does not satisfy the small buyers’ self-sorting
condition: At a zero price, the small buyers would always prefer to "buy" above
the quantity threshold (i.e. receive a large quantity for free, and dispose of the
units they cannot consume) rather than paying sv
L =1( o ra n yo t h e rp o s i t i v e
price) for a small quantity.
Likewise, an oer where sv
L ?f L and so
L =1cannot be replicated through a
rebate tari: in this case, it is the large buyer who would prefer to buy below the
threshold and enjoy a positive surplus on the (few) units he consumes, rather
than buying above the threshold and being left with zero surplus.20
Thus, while rebates still have exclusionary potential, the incumbent’s devi-
ation oers will be less aggressive under rebates than under explicit discrimi-
nation, allowing for entry equilibria to be sustained where they do not exist if
ﬁrms can explicitly price discriminate.
Proposition 5 (entry equilibria under rebates) Under rebates as deﬁned in
(7), entry equilibria only exist if
(i) fH ? 1
2(p+1) and fL  min
n
fH(1 + p)>n+ fH> p
1+p + fH  n
o
(ii) or if fH  1
2(p+1) and fL  min
n
p+(1+p)fH
1+2p >n+ fH> p
1+p + fH  n
o







n(p+1) if fL  1  n  n@p









(1n)(p+1) if fL ?
n(1+p)
p







1  n if sv
H As o
H
Proof: see Appendix A
Corollary 6 The parameter space for which entry equilibria exist under
explicit discrimination is a proper subset of the parameter space for which entry
equilibria exist under rebates.
Proof: see Appendix A
Figure 2 illustrates the results of the analysis of entry equilibria under rebates
and non-negative prices for the case where fH  1
2(p+1) (recall that miscoordi-
nation equilibria exist for all parameter values). We see that the region where
20Such a rebate scheme may appear as somewhat unorthodox, since buyers are “rewarded”
for buying little and “penalized” for buying a lot. However, this is a deviation oer which will
n e v e rb em a d ei ne q u i l i b r i u m .
15Figure 2: Regions where entry equilibria exist and do not exist under rebates
(i.e. implicit price discrimination), compared to explicit discrimination
entry equilibria do not exist is smaller under rebates than under explicit dis-
crimination. While nothing changes for low values of n (rebates exactly replicate
the outcome under explicit discrimination), exclusion becomes more di!cult for
intermediate and high values of n. Intuitively, given p, the large buyer becomes
smaller and smaller the higher n is, and so he becomes more and more similar
to the small buyers, making it di!cult to discriminate between them through
rebates without violating any of the self-sorting conditions.
Note that as p grows, so that a single small buyer becomes smaller and
smaller, both the e!ciency thresholds and prices under rebates converge to the
values under explicit discrimination. In the limit case where p $4 ,t h es e l f -
selection constraints play no role: the large buyer will never want to behave
like a small buyer whose demand is inﬁnitely small, and vice versa for the small
buyer, and so the implicit and explicit discrimination cases coincide.
One feature of our results that is worth noting is that, at the entry equilib-
rium, the price paid by the small buyers can be lower than that paid by the large
buyer. This might appear as a somehow strange result, as one typically asso-
ciates rebates with situations where larger buyers are oered better deals. This
result is an artifact of our model, where the entrant needs to serve both types
of buyers to be viable, and the incumbent can thus disrupt an entry equilibrium
by ’conquering’ either type of buyer. Therefore, when n is small, the entrant
will be obliged to oer a better deal to the small buyers, since the incumbent
would ﬁnd it easier to set lower prices to them than to the large buyer (given
16that n is small, a more attractive oer to the large buyer could not be ﬁnanced
with the smaller surplus extracted from the small buyers). On the other hand,
when n is large, that is when the small buyers account for a large proportion of
the market, the opposite happens: it is the large buyer who receives the lower
price, as one would expect. In richer settings where there are several types of
buyers but where the entrant does not need to serve all buyers, it would be more
likely to ﬁnd situations where it is the larger types of buyers who would receive
the best oers.
Let us take stock of the results obtained in this section. One of the moti-
vations for this paper was to investigate whether rebates, in particular form of
quantity discounts, can be exclusionary. This is especially important in situa-
tions where explicit discrimination is not allowed, and competition authorities
need to understand how to deal with rebates, that is schemes that implicitly dis-
criminate. Our analysis shows that indeed an incumbent ﬁrm could use rebates
to exclude a more e!cient rival (even if the latter can also make use of rebates).
The main intuition is that by relying on quantity discounts the incumbent can
(implicitly) discriminate across buyers by making attractive oers to some of
them, thus subtracting to the rival ﬁrm buyers that it critically needs in order
to reach the minimum viable size. Therefore, rebates reduce the likelihood that
successful entry takes place.
Nevertheless, precisely because they imply competing aggressively for each
group of buyers, rebates also have a procompetitive function: for given market
structures (that is, if one compares regions where entry occurs, and we know
that there always are parameter conﬁgurations for which all new buyers are
served by the entrant), prices are lower when rebates are allowed than when
prices have to be uniform. It is to explore more formally this basic trade-o
between exclusion and lower prices that we now turn to an analysis of consumer
welfare under the dierent price schemes.
4C o n s u m e r W e l f a r e
Recall from Section 2 that, in our model, entry is always socially e!cient, be-
cause the entrant produces at a lower marginal cost than the incumbent. Thus,
all miscoordination equilibria are ine!cient. The higher production costs asso-
ciated with having a less e!cient ﬁrm serve the buyers are the only source of
ine!ciencies in our model: buyers have inelastic demand functions, so they will
always consume the e!cient quantities, no matter how high the prices are.
Yet, prices do matter, as they determine consumer surplus, which is often
considered the objective function of antitrust agencies. Now, comparing equi-
librium prices across dierent price regimes is not straightforward because each
price regime gives rise to multiple equilibria, both entry and miscoordination
equilibria, and each of these can be sustained by a broad range of prices. The
approach we take here is to compare the "worst case scenarios" given market
structure, i.e. the highest sustainable prices under each price regime given that
either the incumbent or the entrant serves the buyers.
17Proposition 7 (consumer surplus)
(i) Miscoordination equilibria: Under all three price regimes (uniform pric-
ing, explicit discrimination, and rebates), the highest equilibrium price is the







uniform =0for m = v>o.
(ii) Entry equilibria: At the highest sustainable prices under each regime,
consumer surplus is maximal under explicit discrimination, intermediate under
rebates, and minimal under uniform pricing:
FVo
explicit  FVo
implicit AF V o





implicit AF V v
uniform A 0 with strict inequality if fL  1  n  n@p
Proof: Under all three price regimes, buyers consume the same quantities.
Thus, their consumer surplus is solely determined by the price they pay: the
higher the price, the lower is consumer surplus.
(i) follows immediately from Propositions 1,2, and 4.
(ii) The following table shows the prices buyers pay under each of the three
price regimes. The inequalities follow from simple algebra.
Table 1: Highest Sustainable Prices in Entry Equilibria
Uniform Implicit Explicit
Large Buyer:
fL ?n s o
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The ranking of consumer surplus is the reverse of the ranking of prices.¤
The main results can be summarized as follows:
• Under uniform pricing, entry equilibria exist for all parameter values, but
the price charged by the entrant is higher than any of the prices under
rebates or explicit discrimination.
• Under rebates, entry equilibria exist for a larger region of the parameter
space than under explicit discrimination. Indeed, if an entry equilibrium
exists under explicit discrimination, it will also exist under rebates; but
explicit discrimination may allow the incumbent to break some entry equi-
libria that would exist under rebates.
18• When entry equilibria exist, the prices charged by the entrant to both
groups of buyers are (weakly) higher under rebates than under explicit
discrimination.
5E x t e n s i o n s
In this Section, we shall deal with a number of extensions to the basic model.
First, we shall analyze in Section 5.1 how results change when we consider
the possibility that ﬁrms subsidize consumption, i.e. can charge negative prices.
This makes the pricing behavior of both ﬁrms more aggressive. Not surprisingly,
the Incumbent will be able to exclude entry for a wider region of parameter
values, but the basic trade-o between exclusion and lower prices acquires now
an important dimension. Indeed, the possibility of setting negative prices, i.e. of
subsidizing buyers for using the product, gives an important tool to the entrant
to disrupt miscoordination equilibria. Contrary to the base model (where prices
were constrained to be non-negative), if negative-price discriminatory oers
can be made, miscoordination equilibria do not always exist. In particular,
unless the gap between incumbent’s and entrant’s costs is su!ciently small,
miscoordination equilibria do not exist, and if they exist they can be sustained
only by lower than monopoly prices.
Next, Section 5.2 will deal with the case of elastic demands, allowing for
both linear prices and two-part taris.21 So far, we have assumed that demands
are inelastic for simplicity. With such demands, unless a productive ine!ciency
arises (as is the case when exclusion occurs), total welfare is the same inde-
pendently of prices. One can argue that lower equilibrium prices will lead to
a better social outcome whenever consumer surplus has a higher weight than
producer surplus in the objective function (and most antitrust authorities tend
to maximize consumer welfare, not total welfare), but it is still important to
look at how our results extend to a setting where demands are elastic.
Furthermore, Section 5.3 discusses the case where ﬁrms are allowed to dis-
criminate even among buyers of the same type, i.e. to set dierent prices for
dierent small buyers. If uniform pricing is at one end of the extreme, this fully
discriminatory price regime is at the other end.
Finally, Section 5.4 examines the case where the suppliers approach buyers
sequentially. It is showed there that sequential moves give rise to unique equi-
librium outcomes for any given set of parameter values. In particular, when the
e!ciency gap between the incumbent and the entrant is large enough, only the
entry equilibrium exists, whereas if the gap is small enough, only the exclusion-
ary equilibrium exists.
21Because of space limitations, we only summarize our ﬁndings, without presenting the full
treatment. The analytics for the elastic demand case and the case of full discrimination are
available from the authors upon request.
195.1 Allowing for usage subsidies
In this section, we keep inelastic demands, but relax the assumption that prices
must be non-negative. Recall that we assumed free disposal of the good. Thus,
a buyer could exploit negative prices by buying an inﬁnite amount of the good.
Therefore, we have to assume that ﬁrms can monitor consumption, and that the
subsidy is only paid for units that are actually consumed, thus limiting sales to
a maximum of 1  n for the large buyer, and n@p for any small buyer.
5.1.1 Uniform prices
Under uniform price oers, the results are the same as in the base model. The
miscoordination equilibrium cannot be disrupted by negative price oers, be-
cause the entrant cannot proﬁtably oer negative prices to all buyers. For
t h es a m er e a s o n ,t h eentry equilibrium will also exist for all parameter values.
Therefore, Proposition 1 still holds good.
5.1.2 Explicit price discrimination
We consider ﬁrst miscoordination equilibria and then entry equilibria.
Miscoordination equilibria The possibility to oer negative prices changes
dramatically the analysis of miscoordination equilibria. Consider for instance a
natural candidate equilibrium, that is the miscoordination equilibrium prevail-
ing under uniform (non-negative) prices: (sv
L =1 >s o
L =1 )and all buyers buy
from the incumbent. Under positive prices, this miscoordination equilibrium is




ﬁrm H sets, for instance, so
H = sp
H =1 , sv
H =0 , and all buyers buy from L.
This is an equilibrium because if a small buyer, who is oered a zero price by
the entrant, decided to switch to the entrant given that all others buy from
the incumbent, he would get zero surplus, because the entrant does not reach
critical mass and hence the utility derived from consuming the product would
be zero. Therefore, the entrant would have no incentive to deviate either.
But this reasoning does not hold any longer when negative prices are admit-
ted. Suppose that ﬁrm L sets sv
L = so
L =1 .I fﬁ r mH sets so
H = so
L  % =1 %
and sv
H ? 0, then all buyers will buy from the entrant. Indeed, by buying
from the entrant each small buyer would receive a strictly positive surplus
(n@p)(sv
H) A 0 even if nobody else consumed the product. Therefore, they
will want to consume in order to receive the payment. But since it is a dominant
strategy for the small buyers to consume the product, the large buyer will now
prefer to buy from the entrant as well, since the critical network size will be
met, and since FVo(so
H)=( 1 n)(1  so
H) AF V o(so
L)=0 .
More generally, a miscoordination equilibrium with prices (sv
L>s o
L) will not
exist if the entrant can oer a negative price sv
H ? 0 to the small buyers such that
FVv(sv
H>v H ? ¯ v) AF V v(sv
L>v L  ¯ v) while slightly undercutting the incumbent’s
20oer to the large buyer, so
H = so
L  %.22
Proposition 8 (miscoordination equilibria under negative prices) Let ¯ vA
(1  n)+ n
p. Let buyers buy from the incumbent whenever it is not a dominant
strategy to buy from the entrant. Then, if both ﬁrms charge negative prices, a
miscoordination equilibrium will only exist if fL  n + fH.
(i) If fH  1  n, the equilibrium is characterized by
so




[1  n  fH]
so
H 5 [0>1]>s v
H = 
1  n  fH
n







Figure 3 illustrates in the space (n>fL) the region where the miscoordination
equilibrium arises, for the case fH ? 1@2. It shows that this equilibrium exists
only if fL is su!ciently close to fH.
The main conclusions from the analysis are that:
(1) when negative prices are possible, then allowing for explicit discrimina-
tion disrupts miscoordination equilibria when fL is su!ciently high.
(2) When a miscoordination equilibrium exists under explicit discrimination
(with linear prices which can be negative), the incumbent will not be able to
enjoy the monopoly outcome (sv
L =1 >s o
L =1 ) ,u n l e s sfH A 1n; the incumbent
needs to lower its prices to prevent the entrant from stealing its buyers.
Compared to uniform pricing regimes, where a miscoordination equilibrium
which reproduces the monopolistic outcome is always possible, allowing for neg-
ative prices has the eect of both rendering miscoordination equilibria less likely,
and, where such equilibria survive, of reducing the equilibrium prices at those
equilibria. Note that in this case, sv
L may even be below-cost, i.e. sv
L ?f L!
Entry equilibria The analysis of entry equilibria when we allow for negative
prices requires just a small modiﬁcation of the problem already analyzed in
Section 3.2 above, i.e. allowing for sv
L and so
L to take negative values, which was
not possible before.
22I nt h ec a s ew h e r e¯ v $ (1 3 n)+ n
p, the entrant might as well charge a negative price
to the large buyer, while matching L’s oer to the small buyers. In this case, as soon as H
attracted the large buyer, H needs just one more buyer to reach the minimum size. Thus, any
small buyer will ﬁnd it optimal to buy from H as well, and the miscoordination equilibrium
is broken. This is not the case if ¯ vA(1 3 n)+ n
p, where the entrant needs more than one
small buyer to reach the minimum size, so that attracting the large buyer is not su!cient to

















Figure 3: Regions where miscoordination equilibria and/or entry equilibria (or
none) exist under negative prices, for fH ? 1@2
Proposition 9 (entry equilibria under negative prices) If both ﬁrms can use






The highest prices that the entrant can charge in any such entry equilibrium are
sv
H =







Proof: see Appendix A
Figure 3 illustrates entry equilibria. Note that under negative pricing, the
incumbent can prevent entry for a larger region of parameter values than under
non-negative prices: in the latter case, entry can also occur for values fL ?
1+fH
2 , whereas under negative prices, the e!ciency threshold shifts to fL = 1+fH
2
everywhere.
The ﬁgure also shows that under explicit discrimination, there might be a
situation where, for given fH and n,f o rfL su!ciently close to fH am i s c o o r d i -
nation equilibrium exists, for intermediate values of fL no equilibrium in pure
strategies exists, and for high values of fL only the entry equilibrium will ex-
ist. (To be precise, such a situation exists if fH ? 1@3). For high values of n,
22there exists an area of parameter values where both miscoordination and entry
equilibria will coexist.
To compare results, recall that under uniform pricing both entry and mis-
coordination equilibria exist under all parameter values. This multiplicity of
equilibria in the base case makes it di!cult to identify precise policy implica-
tions. However incomplete (depending on the values of fH,t h e r em a ya l s oe x i s t
other regions where no equilibria exist under explicit discrimination, or where
multiple equilibria exist also under explicit discrimination), the following Table
allows to ﬁx ideas. It shows that for relatively high e!ciency gaps between
incumbent and entrant, if explicit discrimination schemes are allowed consumer
welfare will always be (weakly) higher than under uniform pricing (miscoordi-
nation equilibria never exist, and entry equilibria are characterized by (weakly)
lower prices). For relatively low e!ciency gaps between incumbent and entrant,
though, the impact on consumer welfare is not unambiguous: at equilibrium,
the incumbent will always serve, and the desirability of explicit discrimination
schemes depends on which equilibrium would prevail under uniform pricing: if
under uniform pricing a miscoordination equilibrium is played, then explicit
discrimination will increase consumer welfare, but if under uniform pricing an
entry equilibrium is played, then explicit discrimination leads to exclusion and
higher prices. We would then ﬁnd again the same tension between exclusion
a n dl o wp r i c e st h a tw eh a v es t r e s s e di nt h em a i nS e c t i o na b o v e ,a l t h o u g hi ti s
to be noticed that - apart from very speciﬁc cases (fH A 1  n)-e x c l u s i o nc a n
be achieved by the incumbent only by decreasing equilibrium prices.















=, FV =1 fL
H serves: b so
H  fL; b sv
H  fL















=, FV =1 fL
L serves: b so
L =1 ;b sv
L : fL
=, FV  1  fL
5.1.3 Implicit price discrimination (rebates)
It would be tedious to characterize all the equilibrium solutions for the case of
rebates as well. Like for the case of explicit discrimination, the possibility to set
negative prices allows the incumbent to make more aggressive oers, eliminating
entry equilibria which would have existed under uniform prices; also, and again
like for explicit discrimination, it allows the entrant to subsidize a group of
buyers and induce them to use the product independently of what other buyers
do, thus leading to the disruption of miscoordination equilibria. The fact that
the self-selection constraint needs to be satisﬁed does not therefore eliminate
the possibility to disrupt some of the equilibria;23 however, it does imply that
23At ﬁrst sight, one may wonder why a buyer may want to buy at positive prices when it
could mimic a buyer who is oered a negative price. But recall that a large buyer may get
23competition is softer under rebates than under explicit discrimination. Even
in this case, therefore, we ﬁnd the result that rebates are less exclusionary
than explicit discrimination, but lead to higher prices when similar equilibrium
market structures are compared.
5.2 Elastic demands
To check the sensitivity of the model to the assumption that demands are in-
elastic, we have also studied the model under the assumption of linear demand
functions. In what follows, we brieﬂy summarize the results obtained (details
available upon request), for the case of linear pricing and two-part pricing re-
spectively.
5.2.1 Linear prices
It turns out that working with elastic demands allows us to uncover an inter-
esting feature of rebates when linear prices are considered. By incorporating a
quantity threshold (a certain price is oered for demand up to a certain number
of units), a rebate scheme contains a de facto rationing scheme which limits the
number of units that a ﬁrm has to sell at a given price. Therefore, when oering
below-cost prices, a rebate allows a ﬁrm to limit losses or, which is the same, for
a given amount of losses that it can sustain, it can aord oering lower prices
than under an explicit discrimination scheme. This points to an interesting
comparison between the relative aggressiveness of rebates v. explicit discrimi-
nation: on the one hand, the necessity to satisfy the self-selection constraints
limits the aggressiveness of rebates, but on the other hand, the presence of an
inherent rationing device (the quantity thresholds) allows a rebate scheme to
make more aggressive oers. Therefore, the result obtained in Corollary 6, that
the parameter space where entry equilibria exist under explicit discrimination
is fully included in the corresponding space under rebates, does no longer hold:
it is possible to ﬁnd parameter values for which prices are lower under rebates
than under explicit price discrimination, and other values for which the opposite
holds. (In any case, uniform pricing always leads to higher prices than implicit
and explicit discrimination.)
N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a tt h eb a s i ct r a d e - o  between competition and exclusion
still arises here. The more aggressive a pricing scheme, the lower the equilibrium
prices for given market structure; but also the more likely that exclusion may
arise at equilibrium.
Finally, it can be showed that, as one would expect under elastic demand
and linear prices, the results on the eects of the dierent pricing schemes
on consumer welfare obtained above extend to total welfare: for given market
structure, the lower the price at the entry equilibrium the higher total welfare.
more surplus from buying 13n units at a positive price than a smaller number of units n@p at
a negative price. However, we have seen in Section 3.3 that small buyers will never be willing
to buy at positive price if they have the chance to buy more units than they need at zero
price. A fortiori, this is true when the price oered for a large number of units is negative.
245.2.2 Two-part taris
While the analysis becomes more tedious when working with linear demands
and two-part taris, the results are very similar in spirit to the ones of our
benchmark case, i.e. of inelastic demands and linear prices. Given linear de-
mands, if the ﬁrms can use explicitly discriminatory two-part taris, the ﬁrms
will set the variable component of the price at marginal cost (thus maximizing
total surplus), and use the ﬁxed fee to transfer rents between buyers (e.g. the
incumbent could break an entry equilibrium by extracting all consumer surplus
from the large buyer, and sharing it among the small buyers through a negative
ﬁxed fee).
Again, the only dierence between rebates and explicit discrimination is
given by the presence of the self-selection constraints under the former scheme.
Under two-part taris, these self-selection constraints lead to the well-known
usage price distortions: at the miscoordination equilibrium, for instance, the
incumbent will charge an above-cost unit price to the small buyers, thus reducing
the quantity threshold, and making it less attractive for the large buyer to
behave as a small buyer. This allows the incumbent to extract more rent from
the large buyer without violating his self-selection constraint.
Unlike the linear-price case, under two-part taris, ﬁrms will never want to
ration buyers when they can explicitly discriminate among them, and so there
is no sense in which rebates are superior relative to explicit discrimination.
Instead, whenever they lead to usage price distortions, rebates reduce total
surplus, and hence the rent that can be appropriated by ﬁrms. Thus, under two-
part taris, rebates are always less aggressive (and therefore less exclusionary)
than explicit discrimination.
5.3 Full Discrimination
In this section, we consider the case where ﬁrms can discriminate among buy-
ers of the same type. To see why this reinforces the exclusionary potential of
discriminatory pricing, consider the following example: there are p =5small
buyers, and to reach the minimum size, the entrant must serve at least p =4
of these small buyers, plus of course the large buyer. Then, to break an entry
equilibrium, it is su!cient for the incumbent to "steal" two of the small buy-
ers: this leaves the entrant with only 3 of them, and so it will fall short of the
minimum size. This in turn would allow the incumbent to charge the monopoly
price not only to the large buyer, but also to the 3 small buyers who are forced
to switch to the incumbent once the ﬁrst two left the entrant. Now, this means
that the price oers the incumbent can make to the ﬁrst two will be a lot more
generous than if it had to simultaneously steal all ﬁve small buyers, with only
the revenue from the large buyer left to compensate for the losses made on the
small buyers. Thus, under full discrimination, the incumbent’s price oers to
the small buyers are more aggressive than under "explicit discrimination" (as
discussed in this paper), i.e. when buyers of the same size must be oered the
same price. Note that the entrant will have to oer the incumbent’s lowest price
25to all 5 small buyers, and therefore the e!ciency threshold for entry equilibria
to exist will be even higher than under explicit discrimination. This conﬁrms
again the trade-o between exclusionary potential and lower prices given market
structure which was emphasized in this paper.
5.4 Sequential buyers
The fact that the model gives rise to multiple equilibria for the same set of pa-
rameter values may raise some di!culties as to the possible implications of the
model. Since the features of our model share some similarities with the model
analyzed by Segal and Whinston (2000), and since they show that unique solu-
tions can be obtained when buyers move sequentially rather than simultaneously,
it seems natural to study sequential moves in our setting as well. As expected,
we also ﬁnd unique equilibria for any given set of parameter values (at least for
the case where ﬁrms are allowed to set negative prices to buyers).
Consider the following version of our game. There are p +1buyers, one
large and p small buyers. The entrant needs the large buyer plus at least
pv  p small buyers to reach minimum size. More formally, deﬁne pv by
(1  n)+pv
n
p  ¯ v and (1  n)+( pv  1) n
p ? ¯ v.
Play occurs in the following sequence: Stage 1: L and H choose so
L and so
H.
Stage 2: the large buyer decides which ﬁrm to buy from. Stage 3: L and H
choose sv
L and sv
H. Stage 4: The ﬁrst small buyer, SB1, decides which ﬁrm to
buy from. (...) Stage p +3 : The last small buyer, SBm, decides which ﬁrm to
buy from.
Of course, there are many other possible orders in which buyers could move,
but for simplicity, we restrict attention to this sequence of moves here.
For shortness, we also limit ourselves to consider the case of explicit price
discrimination. The following can be proved.
Proposition 10 (sequential buyers, explicit price discrimination)
(a) If suppliers can set negative prices, then:
• if fL  fH+n






L =1 , and all buyers buy from L;
• if fL A fH+n






L = fL,a n da l lb u y e r sb u yf r o mH.
(b) If prices are restricted to be non-negative, then multiple equilibria can
arise.
Proof. We solve the game by backward induction.
Stage p +3(last buyer’s move): Depending on how play evolved over the
previous p+2stages, we can distinguish 2 cases: Case 1: The large buyer and
at least pv1 small buyers already bought from H. Then, the p-th small buyer
c a nb es u r et h a tH will reach the minimum size, and will therefore buy from
26H if sv
H  sv
L,a n df r o mL otherwise. Case 2: H could not attract a su!cient
number of buyers over the previous stages. Then, the p-th small buyer will
either buy from L (if sv
L  1) or not buy at all.24
Stage p +2(last-but-one buyer’s move): Again, we have several cases:
C a s e1a n d2a r ei d e n t i c a lt ot h o s eo fS t a g ep+3.C a s e3 :T h el a r g eb u y e r
and exactly pv  2 small buyers already bought from H. Then, if sv
H  sv
L
and the last-but-one buyer opts for H, he can be sure that the last buyer will
follow suit (i.e. play will be in Case 1 of Stage p +3 ), and so the entrant will
reach minimum size. If instead the last-but-one buyer buys from L, so will the
last buyer. Thus, if sv
H  sv
L, the last buyer buys from H, and he buys from L
otherwise.
. . .
Stage p +4 pv (the ﬁrst of the last pv small buyers moves): Suppose
the large buyer bought from H,a n dsv
H  sv
L. Then, no matter if any of the
previous p  pv small buyers bought from H or not, the buyer called to move
now knows that if he buys from H, all remaining pv 1 buyers will follow suit,
so that H will reach minimum size. If instead the large buyer bought from L,
or sv
H As v
L, the buyer will buy from L.
. . .
Stage 4 (the ﬁrst small buyer’s move): If the large buyer bought from H and
sv
H  sv
L, then the ﬁrst small buyer knows that starting from stage p+4pv,
all small buyers will buy from H, no matter what the previous small buyers did.
Thus, the ﬁrst small buyer will buy from H as well. If instead the large buyer
bought from L,o rsv
H As v
L, the ﬁrst buyer will buy from L.
Stage 3 (the suppliers’ oers to the small buyers): Suppliers can only choose
one price for all p small buyers. If the large buyer opted for L in the ﬁrst stage,
the incumbent is the monopolist over the small buyers, and will extract all the
rent from them, sv
L =1 .I fH wanted to compete for the small buyers, it would
have to charge a negative price to attract them. But H has no interest in doing
this, because there is no other buyer on whom it could recover the resulting
losses. If instead the large buyer bought from H, the two suppliers compete for
the remaining small buyers. L will want to serve them as long as sv
L  fL. H
knows that all small buyers will buy from it as long as sv
H  sv
L. A Bertrand-like
reasoning leads to equilibrium prices sv
H = sv
L = fL.
Stage 2 (the large buyer’s move): If the large buyer buys from H,h ec a nb e
sure that H will set its price to the small buyers such that all small buyers will





L, he buys from L.I nc a s eo fap r i c et i e ,t h el a r g eb u y e rm a y
either buy from H or from L.
Stage 1 (the suppliers’ oers to the large buyer): If L wins the large buyer,
it can charge sv
L =1to the small buyers and make proﬁts
L =( so
L  fL)(1  n)+( 1 fL)n
24Unless the entrant oers a negative price, in which case p-th small buyer may rather buy
from H. But we will argue below that this will never happen.
27If instead H wins the large buyer, it will also serve the small buyers, though at
”Bertrand” price sv
H = fL.T h u s ,H’s proﬁts are
H =( so
H  fH)(1  n)+( fL  fH)n
Thus, everything boils down to who can oer the lower price to the large buyer.
An exclusionary equilibrium exists if:
H =( so
H  fH)(1  n)+( fL  fH)n =0
L =( so
H  fL)(1  n)+( 1 fL)n  0
If we impose non-negativity on so
H, we obtain two possible solutions:
• if fL ?f H@n, so
H = so
L = fHnfL
1n and L  0 if fL ? fH+n
1+n ;
• if fL Af H@n, so
H = so
L =0and L  0 if fL ?n =
An entry equilibrium exists if:
L =( so
L  fL)(1  n)+( 1 fL)n =0
H =( so
L  fH)(1  n)+( fL  fH)n  0
Again, restricting prices to be non-negative, we get:
• if fL An , so
H = so
L = fLn
1n and H  0 if fL A fH+n
1+n ;
• if fL ?n , so
H = so
L =0and H  0 if fL Af H@n=
We see that whenever fH@n ? fL ?n , both ﬁrms oer price zero to the large
buyer. In this case, the large buyer is indierent between buying from L or from
H, and so both the exclusionary and the entry equilibrium exist, as stated in
part (b) of Proposition 10.
If we allow instead for strictly negative prices, we obtain a unique equilib-
rium, which is either an exclusionary or an entry equilibrium, as indicated in
part (a) of Proposition 10:
If fL ? fH+n
1+n there is an exclusionary equilibrium; if fL A fH+n
1+n there is an
entry equilibrium.¤
The existence of a unique exclusionary equilibrium is particularly interesting.
Note that - as in Segal and Whinston (2000) - the sequentiality of moves resolves
the miscoordination problem among buyers. Thus, the exclusionary equilibrium
does not arise from simple miscoordination among buyers. Rather, it exists
because the incumbent can exploit the externalities that the large buyer exerts
on all other buyers: Similar to Bernheim and Whinston’s (1998) setup of non-
coincident markets, the ﬁrst-moving buyer and the incumbent share the rent
that can be extracted from future buyers.
28Note also that if we require prices to be uniform across all buyers, i.e. so
L =
sv
L = sL and so
H = sv
H = sH, a straightforward extension of the argument above
shows that the entry equilibrium would be the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 11 (sequential buyers, uniform pricing)
There is a unique entry equilibrium where sH = sL = fL, and all buyers buy
from H=
Proof. First of all, note that prices chosen by suppliers at stage 1 of the
game also apply to the small buyers (therefore no new decisions are taken at
stage 3). Also keep in mind that under uniform pricing the incumbent cannot
sell below marginal cost to only a subset of buyers. Solve the game by backward
induction. From stage p+3to stage 4 the proof ﬂows identical to the proof of
the previous proposition, and stage 3 prices are determined by stage 1 decisions.
At stage 2,i fsH ?s L, the large buyer knows that if it buys from H,a l ls m a l l
buyers will buy from H as well. Therefore,it will buy from H.I fsH As L, it will
buy from L.I fsH = sL, it will be indierent. At stage 1, the game played by
the two suppliers will have the same features as the usual Bertrand game. The
entrant will set the price sH = fL (or a shade below it) and all buyers will buy
from it.¤
In the case of uniform pricing, entry could never be deterred. Thus, if fL
is small enough relative to fH, we would have entry under uniform pricing but
exclusion under discrimination. For high enough values of fL,w ew o u l dh a v e
entry in both cases, but under price discrimination the equilibrium prices (to
the large buyer) will be lower. In other words, banning discriminatory pricing
would increase welfare for small e!ciency gaps, but would decrease it for large
enough e!ciency gaps.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper was to demonstrate the exclusionary potential of
rebate taris in a model with network externalities. Our ﬁndings are particularly
interesting insofar as, in our model, the entrant is in a fairly good initial position
compared to other papers on exclusionary practices: it does not have to pay any
ﬁxed cost to start operating in the industry, entrant and incumbent can approach
all buyers simultaneously (i.e. the incumbent has no ﬁrst-mover advantage in
oering contracts to the buyers before the entrant can do so), and the entrant
has the same pricing instruments at its disposal. In other words, in our paper
the incumbent has an incumbency advantage (when the game starts, it has
already reached the minimum threshold number of buyers for its network to be
viable, whereas the - more e!cient - entrant has not) but no other strategic
advantage.
In the base model, we assume that ﬁrms can only charge non-negative linear
prices. First of all, we ﬁnd that exclusionary equilibria exist for all parameter
values, and that even monopoly prices can be sustained in these exclusionary
29equilibria under each price regime (uniform pricing, explicit discrimination, and
rebates).
As for entry equilibria, we ﬁnd that the more aggressive the price regime
the smaller the region of the parameter space where they exist: under uniform
pricing, entry equilibria always exist, whereas under rebates and explicit price
discrimination they exist only if the entrant is su!ciently more e!cient than
the incumbent (and the condition is the tightest under explicit price discrimi-
nation). On the other hand, if we look at regions where entry equilibria exist
under all three regimes, we ﬁnd that consumers would be better o under ex-
plicit discrimination, followed by rebates (or implicit discrimination) and ﬁnally
uniform pricing. This trade-o between exclusionary potential and (for given
market structure) lower equilibrium prices is one of the main themes of this
paper.
Allowing for subsidies (i.e., negative prices) does not change the main insight
of our analysis: more aggressive pricing allows the incumbent to exclude the
entrant for an even wider region of parameter values, while reducing even further
the highest prices that can be sustained in any entry equilibrium. In addition,
the possibility of subsidizing buyers for using the product, gives an important
tool to the entrant to disrupt miscoordination equilibria. If the gap between
incumbent’s and entrant’s costs is su!ciently large, miscoordination equilibria
do not exist, and if they exist they can be sustained only by lower than monopoly
prices. Overall, usage subsidies (i) make exclusion most likely, but (ii) given
market structure, results in the lowest prices.
Our paper emphasizes a fundamental dilemma that is at the origin of the
di!culties of dealing with price abuses in competition law. If antitrust agencies
and courts pursued a policy of forbidding discriminatory pricing they might
avoid exclusion of e!cient entry in some cases, but at the cost of having higher
prices whenever entry is not an issue. Note also that forbidding discrimination
(or below-cost) pricing to the dominant incumbent would not help either: this
would prevent it from excluding, but - in the case where entry would occur
anyhow - it would also prevent consumers from beneﬁting from lower prices (at
an entry equilibrium with price discrimination, prices will be lower because the
entrant will have to match the more aggressive prices of the incumbent; if the
latter cannot price aggressively, the entrant will not need to decrease its prices).
The reader might be uncomfortable about predictions obtained in a model
characterized by multiple equilibria. However, the analysis of the game for the
case where buyers are approached sequentially (rather than simultaneously) by
the suppliers avoids miscoordination issues and multiple equilibria but gives rise
to results which are very similar in spirit. If suppliers cannot price discriminate,
there is a unique equilibrium where entry always occurs. If suppliers can dis-
criminate, the results depend on the e!ciency gap between the incumbent and
the entrant. When it is small enough, the incumbent will always be able to
exclude. When instead the entrant is much more e!cient, only the entry equi-
librium exists, and prices are lower than under uniform pricing. In principle,
one could therefore conclude that price discrimination would be good (because
it leads to lower prices) or bad (because it excludes the more e!cient supplier)
30depending on the ﬁrms’ cost levels. However, one could hardly recommend a
policy rule conditional on the ﬁrms’ costs, which among other things are very
di!cult to estimate. Therefore, despite the sharper predictions allowed by a
version of the model where multiple equilibria are avoided, in practical terms
the basic trade-o between promoting more price competition and reducing the
scope for exclusionary conduct still remains, and we see no justiﬁcation for a
per se rule outlawing discriminatory pricing and rebates by dominant ﬁrms.
Interesting extensions of our model could be to allow for buyers to compete
against each other downstream, to see whether ﬁerce downstream competition
may eliminate miscoordination problems (as showed by Fumagalli and Motta
(2006) in the context of exclusive dealing). Another issue of interest could be to
allow for partial compatibility between L’s and H’s network, and to introduce
compatibility as a strategic choice variable.25
In this paper, we have chosen to model scale eects as a demand-side variable,
by using network eects and by considering a network’s installed base as the
incumbency advantage. However, our results would be identical if we assumed
there are scale economies, and that there is a ﬁrm which has already paid its
sunk costs, as the incumbency advantage.
Consider the following game. At time 1, ﬁrms L and H simultaneously
set prices (according to the dierent price regimes, prices can be uniform or
dierentiated); at time 2, all buyers decide which ﬁrm they want to buy from
and make ﬁrm orders; at time 3,ﬁ r mH decides on entry (if it does enter, it
has to pay sunk cost iA0); at time 4,p a y o s are realized. Like in Section
2, continue to assume that there are p small buyers and 1 large buyer, and
let the sunk cost i be large enough so that entry is proﬁtable only if ﬁrm H
serves the large buyer plus at least one small buyer.26 With these modiﬁcations,
results will be of the same nature as those obtained in this paper, and even the
calculations will be to a large extent the same.27
Finally, one may wonder how the existence of switching costs (which play an
important role in shaping entry in the real world) would change our model. First
of all, consider our basic model with network ee c t s . O n es i m p l ew a yt ot a k e
switching costs into account would be to assume that (equivalently to the ’old’
buyers in the basic model) there are buyers who have arbitrarily large switching
costs and therefore would never buy from the entrant, and (equivalently to
the ’new’ buyers in the basic model) buyers who have switching costs  which
are small enough, so that the entrant’s eective marginal cost, fH +   e fH,
is still lower than the incumbent’s: fH + ?f L. Provided that there are
25If networks were fully compatible, no issue of miscoordination would arise, but assuming
costly interoperability and a demand which rises continuously in the size of the network might
render the study of interoperability decisions in our model interesting (see Crémer et al, 2000).
26Similarly, in our base model, we have chosen the threshold network size v so that the
minimum scale was reached only if the large and at least one small buyer were consuming the
entrant’s network product.
27Fumagalli and Motta (2001) study a similar model with economies of scale in production.
However, they focus on the role of buyer power and downstream competition, and do not
consider price discrimination and rebates (buyers are identical in their model).
31both large and small buyers among the latter category of buyers, and after
replacing fH with the eective marginal cost e fH, the analysis would be the same
as in our model, and the comparative statics on the switching costs would be
straightforward. An increase in switching costs  would be equivalent to an
increase in the marginal cost of the entrant, e fH,a n dw o u l dt h u sl e a dt om o r e
likely exclusionary equilibria.
Similarly, one could easily incorporate switching costs into a model where
scale eects are due to a minimum e!cient scale of production: it would be
enough to assume again that all buyers have a small (as deﬁned above) switching
cost.
Of course, one could ﬁnd more sophisticated and interesting ways to incor-
porate switching costs in the analysis, but it is clear that the basic mechanisms
illustrated in this paper would still take place and would be exacerbated by the
existence of switching costs. Both under consumption externalities and under
economies of scale, switching costs would add to the incumbency advantage
provided by the installed base and the sunk cost, respectively. Note, however,
that in our framework, switching costs alone (i.e. without installed base or sunk
cost) would not be su!cient to obtain the results.
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337A p p e n d i x A - P r o o f s
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
(i) Suppose that all buyers buy from L. Then, recall that ¯ vAmax {1  n>n},
implying that none of the individual buyers alone is su!cient for H to reach the
minimum size. Thus, H’s product has zero value for any single buyer, and so no
buyer will want to deviate and buy from H,e v e ni fsH were strictly lower than
sL. L sets sL = sp
L , which is the highest among all prices under which buyers will
miscoordinate on the incumbent (at a price strictly above the prohibitive price,
buyers would stop buying altogether). Thus, L has no incentive to increase or
decrease its price. Since in all continuation equilibria buyers will not switch to
H even if the price dierence between the two ﬁrms is maximal, i.e. even if H
charges sH = fH, H has no incentive to decrease its price either.
(ii) With all buyers buying from H at sH = fL, total demand is ptv
H (sH)+
to
H (sH)=1 ¯ v,a n ds oH will reach the minimum size. Thus, H’s product
h a st h es a m ev a l u et ot h eb u y e r sa sL’s, and it sells at the same price. Given
that buyers coordinate on the entrant whenever H’s oer is at least as good
as L’s, no buyer has an incentive to deviate and buy from L instead. L will
not want to deviate either: To attract the buyers, L w o u l dh a v et os e tap r i c e
sL ?f L, i.e. sell at a loss; and increasing sL above fL will not attract any buyers
in any continuation equilibria. H has no incentive to change its price either:
increasing sH would imply losing the buyers to L, and decreasing sH will just
reduce proﬁts.
There can be no equilibrium where H serves all buyers at a price sH Af L:
In this case, L could proﬁtably undercut H,a n da l lb u y e r sw o u l ds w i t c ht oL.¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
First, the best oer the incumbent can make to the small buyers is given by









L  fL)n +( so
L  fL)(1  n)  0
(ii) sv
L 5 [0>1]>s o
L 5 [0>1]>
(9)
where (i) is the proﬁtability constraint of the incumbent.
Next, note that the best oer the incumbent can make to the large buyer is




L)=( 1 n)(1 so
L)> s.to:
(i) (sv
L  fL)n +( so
L  fL)(1  n)  0
(ii) sv
L 5 [0>1]>s o
L 5 [0>1]
(10)
We see that the best oer the incumbent can make to the small buyers is
to set so
L = sP
L =1and lower sv
L as much as possible while still satisfying the
proﬁtability constraint (i); likewise, the best oer to the large buyer is obtained
by setting sv
L = sP
L and lowering so
L as much as allowed by (i).
34The oer ( sv
L>s P
L ) to the small buyers is feasible as long as the incumbent





L)+( 1 n)(1 fL)  0> (11)
The oer (sP
L >s o
L) to the large buyer is feasible as long as:




(1  fL)  0= (12)
Call b sv
L and b so
L respectively the prices that solve the equations associated
with inequalities (11) and (12) above. The lowest possible deviation prices of
the incumbent are identiﬁed by respectively:
sv
L =m a x ( b sv
L>0) and so
L =m a x ( b so
L>0)>
since we limit attention to non-negative prices (see below for the case where
prices can be negative).
The entrant can match the incumbent’s deviations if it is able to oer
(weakly) more surplus to the buyers, while still making proﬁts. In other words,
















H)=( 1 n)(1  so
H)  FVo(so




H)  0= (15)
Optimality requires the entrant oering the highest among all prices that






from which condition (15) becomes:
n(sv
H  fH)+( 1 n)(so





L  fH)+( 1 n)(so
L  fH)  0= (16)






. By solving the equalities associated with
(11) and (12) above, we obtain:
b sv
L =







Note that b sv
L ?f L and b so
L ?f L;a l s o :
35b sv
L  0 if fL  1  n; and b so
L  0 if fL  n=





L if fL  1  n




L if fL  n
0 if fL ?n
This identiﬁes four regions, and for each of them we have to verify whether
(15) holds or not:
if fL 5 [1  n>n] and n  1@2: H(b sv
L>0)  0
if fL 5 [n>1  n] and n?1@2: H(0> b so
L)  0
if fL ? min {n>1  n}: H(0>0)  0
hovh : H(b sv
L> b so
L)  0



















(2) H(0> b so














 fH(1  n)  0
which holds for:
fL  1+fH  n  fL3=
(4) H(0>0) = fH  0>
which never holds, apart from the knife-edge case where fH =0 . (Since prices
cannot go below zero in this basic model, the best that the incumbent can oer
to buyers is to give them the good for free; but when fH =0 , the entrant could
match that oer without making losses, and entry equilibria would always exist.
Clearly, though, this is a very special case.)
Finally, straightforward algebra shows that if fL  max{n>1  n},s ot h a t
threshold fL1 = 1+fH
2 applies, we have that fL1 =m i n {fL1>fL2>fL3}> and the
analogous relation holds for the other two threshold values of fL:i nt h ep a r a -
meter region where fLl applies, fLl =m i n{fL1>fL2>fL3}.¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :
In order to ﬁnd the conditions under which entry equilibria exist, we proceed
in three steps.
First, we look for the best possible oer sv
L that the incumbent can make
to the small buyers; second, we look for the best possible oer so
L that the
36incumbent can make to the large buyer; third, we see whether the entrant is
able to make a proﬁtable oer ( sv
H,so
H> ¯ tH) to the small and the large buyer
such that they are at least as well o as if they bought from the incumbent.


















L  fL)n +( so
L  fL)(1  n)  0
(ii) sv
L 5 [0>1]>s o








L)(1  n)  ¯ tv






















L applies to all purchases tm  ¯ tv
L, while so
L applies
whenever tm A ¯ tv
L.
Constraints (i) to (iv) fully determine the solution. Wlog, we can set ¯ tv
L = n
p,






that satisfy the remaining constraints. Note
that the incumbent would like to set sv
L as low as possible, while charging the
highest possible price to the large buyer. However, L can no longer set so
L =1(as
under explicit discrimination), because at this price the large buyer is left with
zero surplus, and so his self-sorting condition can never be satisﬁed (he would
prefer to buy even a very small quantity, n@p,a tap r i c esv
L ? 1,t h a nal a r g e
quantity 1  n at the prohibitive price). Hence, the large buyer’s self-selection












At any solution to the program, we must have sv
L ?s o
L, so the small buyers’
self-sorting condition, constraint (iv), is never binding. Then, either the break-
even constraint (i), or the non-negativity constraint on sv
L (ii), are binding along








(1  n)(p +1 )






> if fL ? 1  n  n@p=









L)=( 1 n)(1  so
L)> s.to:
(i) (sv
L  fL)n +( so
L  fL)(1  n)  0
(ii) sv
L 5 [0>1]>s o
L 5 [0>1]> ¯ to


























L applies to all t
m
L ? ¯ to
L,w h i l eso
L applies to all
t
m
L  ¯ to
L. Note that the two quantity thresholds ¯ tv
L and ¯ to
L are indexed by v and
o to make it clear to which of the two programs they belong.
Now, we can set ¯ to
L =( 1  n) wlog. The incumbent would like to set so
L
as low as possible. (But recall that so
L =0can never satisfy the self-selection
constraint of the small buyers, who would always prefer to buy a quantity (1n)
at zero price - and throw away 1nn@p units - than a smaller quantity n@p
at positive price.) In order to satisfy the proﬁtability constraint and the small
buyers’ self-selection constraint respectively, the following must hold:
sv
L 











Under any solution to Program (18), we have that sv
L As o
L (the reason
being analogous to Program (17). It follows immediately that constraint (iii)
will never be binding at any solution to Program (18). Then, either self-sorting
condition (iv), or the sv
L  1 constraint (ii), are binding along with the break-



























n(p+1) if fL  1  n  n@p









(1n)(p+1) if fL ?
n(1+p)
p
Again, these are the highest prices that the entrant can charge in any entry






must be high enough to allow the






identiﬁes four regions, and for
each of them we have to verify whether (15) holds or not:
38(i) if fL 5
h









(ii) if fL 5
h
n(1+p)




1n )  0
(iii) if fL ? min
n
n(1+p)




(iv) else: H(1 
p(1fL)
n(p+1) > fLn
1n )  0








+ fH  n
(ii) H(0> fLn
1n )  0 holds for:
fL  n + fH
(iii) H(0> fL
(1n)(p+1))  0 holds for:








If fH ? 1
2(p+1),t h e nw eh a v et h a tfH(1 + p) ?
p+(1+p)fH
1+2p ? 1
2.T e d i o u s
algebra shows that in this case, fL 
p+(1+p)fH
1+2p is redundant, and that each
of the remaining thresholds is the minimum of all thresholds in the parame-
ter region where it applies. Conversely, if fH  1
2(p+1),t h e nw eh a v et h a t
p+(1+p)fH
1+2p ?f H(1+p) and fH(1+p)  1
2.I nt h i sc a s e ,fL  fH(1+p) is re-
dundant, and each of the remaining thresholds is the minimum of all thresholds
in the parameter region where it applies.
Finally, note that - unlike the case of explicit discrimination - in principle it
may not be enough if the entrant simply matches the incumbent’s oer, because
at prices sv
H = e sv
L and so
H = e so
L, it may be that one of the self-selection constraints
is violated. In other words, the self-selection conditions on the one hand aect
the incumbent by obliging it to set (weakly) higher prices but on the other hand
also aect the entrant by obliging it to set (weakly) higher prices as well. Thus,







also satisfy the large and small buyers’ self-sorting conditions, so that they can
actually sustain an entry equilibrium:
(i) If e sv
L ? e so
L,l e t¯ tH = n
p. Then, only the large buyer’s self-selection
constraint could be violated (but not the small buyers’). But recall that e sv
L
derives from Program (17), i.e. the incumbent’s best oer to the small buyers,







satisﬁes the large buyer’s self-selection constraint
by construction. Now, we also have that
so
L A e so
L = so
H








higher than the price under L’s best oer to the large buyer, e so
L,w h i c hi sa l s ot h e











satisfy the large buyer’s self-selection condition.
(ii) For the complementary case e sv
L A e so
L,a n d¯ tH =1 n,o n l yt h es m a l l




L), which solves Program (18), satisﬁes the small buyers’ self-selection
constraint by construction, and that sv
L A e sv







small buyers’ self-selection constraint as well.¤
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y6 :
Under explicit discrimination, the lower bound on fL for entry equilibria to
exist is min
©1+fH
2 >n+ fH>1  n + fH
ª
.N o w ,i ffH ? 1
2(p+1), the corresponding
condition under rebates reads fL  min
n
fH(1 + p)>n+ fH> p
1+p + fH  n
o
.
Comparing the components of the two sets, we see that the second component
is the same, n+fH = n+fH. The third component is lower under rebates, p
1+p+
fH  n?1  n + fH. Finally, fH ? 1
2(p+1) implies that fH(1 + p) ? 1+fH
2 , i.e.
the ﬁrst component is lower under rebates as well. If instead fH  1
2(p+1),t h e
ﬁrst component under rebates is
p+(1+p)fH
1+2p , which is always smaller than 1+fH
2 .
Thus, we can conclude that the parameter space for which entry equilibria exist
under rebates fully includes the corresponding parameter space under explicit
discrimination.¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 :
To make it a dominant strategy for the small buyers to buy from H, H must
oer a price sv











We see immediately that sv
H  (1  sv
L) ? 0 (H subsidizes small buyers’
consumption of its product). If the small buyers consume H’s product for sure,
then the large buyer will switch to H whenever so
H  so
L. Will H be able to





i n t ot h ep r o ﬁ tf u n c t i o nw eh a v et h a t
n(1  sv
L)  fH + so
L (1  n)  0
Rearranging this break-even constraint, we obtain
sv





L (1  n)  fH
¤
40Looking at it from the point of view of the incumbent, this means that given
so
L, sv




L (1  n)  fH
¤
,o re l s eL becomes vulnerable to
the deviation described above. Hence, L’s problem reads
maxsv
L>so
L L =( sv




























L (1  n)  fH
¤
into
the objective function to see that the choice variables drop out, so that the
objective function reduces to:
L = n + fH  fL
Thus, L will be able to break even i
fL  n + fH
(i) Let fH  1n.I ft h ei n c u m b e n tr a i s e sso
L above 1 (the prohibitive price),
the large buyer will not buy anything. Reducing so
L below 1 would only reduce
proﬁts. Note that fH  1  n implies that sv
L  1.I f t h ei n c u m b e n tr a i s e ssv
L
above 1  1









(1  n  fH) A
n
p
(1  ˜ sv
L)
Reducing sv
L below 1  1
n [1  n  fH] would only reduce proﬁts.
Under this equilibrium, all buyers buy from the incumbent, so that the
entrant’s proﬁts are zero. We argued before that the entrant’s optimal deviation
is to set so
H = so
L =1 , and to reduce sv
H below 1nfH
n to attract the small
buyers. But such an oer would violate the entrant’s break-even condition:
˜ sv
Hn  fH + so
L (1  n) ? n(1  sv
L)  fH + so
L (1  n)=0
The entrant has no incentive either to increase sv
H above 1nfH
n ,a si td o e s
not make any sales in equilibrium.
Finally, no individual buyer has any incentive to deviate and buy from the
entrant instead: each of the small buyers is indierent between L’s and H’s oer,
and the large buyer strictly prefers to buy from L than being the only buyer to
buy from H.
Can there be any other miscoordination equilibrium, where L charges a lower
so
L,n a m e l yso





L (1  n)  fH
¤
?
No, because no matter which prices H sets, L would want to increase so
L to 1
without changing sv
L, thereby increasing proﬁts without losing the large buyer
to H. Therefore, such a price pair cannot sustain an equilibrium.
41(ii) Let fH A 1  n,a n dl e tsv
L = so
L =1 . Clearly, the incumbent has no
incentive to change its prices. Recall that under H’s optimal deviation, H’s
break-even condition reads
n(1  sv
L)  fH + so
L (1  n)  0
Inserting sv
L = so
L =1 ,w eg e t
fH +( 1 n)  0
This condition is always violated if fH A 1n. In other words, business-stealing
by the entrant is impossible even if the incumbent charges monopoly prices to
both groups of buyers. Therefore, the entrant is indierent among all the prices
it can set such that L serves the buyers: sv
H = so
H =1dominates all others. The
rest of the proof is analogous to the reasoning above.¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 :
The best oer the incumbent can make to the small buyers is given by the








L  fL)n +( so
L  fL)(1  n)  0
(ii) sv
L  1>s o
L  1=
(19)





L)=( 1 n)(1 so
L)> s.to:
(i) (sv
L  fL)n +( so
L  fL)(1  n)  0
(ii) sv
L  1>s o
L  1=
(20)
By following the same steps as in Section 3.2 one can check that the incum-
bent’s best oers are
b sv
L =







An entry equilibrium will exist only if the entrant is able to proﬁtably match
simultaneously both best oers, i.e. sv
H = b sv
L,a n dso
H = b so
L. Therefore, such an
















which is satisﬁed for:
fL 
1+fH
2
=
¤
42